The Rise Of The Chief Geopolitical Officer

UBS’s 26^th Great China Conference in Shanghai (c.3,600 participants and 300 firms) addressed several themes relevant to 2026 and beyond. Sessions focused on geopolitics and technology, given their implications for capital allocation. Here are my main takeaways.

According to the prevailing narrative, the previous global order has failed to deliver on its foundational promises. As a result, the world has been thrust into a rule-free transition phase. The US and China are now positioning themselves to lead a multi-decade transition to the next global order, possibly overseen by new supranational institutions. Europe was often cast as a ‘loser’ in that process.

Presently fashionable references to a fragmenting, multi-polar world would consolidate into a bipolar system. It was noted that the current US foreign policy is driving many countries (e.g., India, Canada) toward closer engagement with China, described as a more predictable partner than the US. That said, the situation in Venezuela was seen as complicating Beijing’s strategy in Latin America.

China’s anti-involution campaign, rapid technological advances in manufacturing, energy, and mobility (incl. the low altitude economy), global brands building, and relentless move toward consumption are supporting its evolution from high-speed to high-quality growth, emphasizing balance and sustainability. Shanghai in the background served as a reminder of China’s long history, robust economic performance, and technological prowess – not to mention its exceptional cuisine. It was difficult not to be impressed.

Despite optimism about China’s ongoing transformation and foreign investors steadily adding positions in Chinese equities, renminbi internationalization is expected to progress only gradually. More imports would help tame China’s trade surplus and support the internationalization of the Chinese currency.

On AI, a regional contrast was highlighted. The US is building a capital-intensive AI infrastructure, with an economy described as a ‘big bet on AI’. China, instead, is focused on a capital-efficient adoption of AI (presumably betting on a decline in the value of computing power). To my surprise, few concerns were raised about political responses to slow the rise of AI applications as they disrupt the labor market.

Robotics, a primary channel through which AI reaches the physical world, was in full display. However, growth forecasts for humanoids were cautious. The complexity of building reliable, multi-purpose machines that flawlessly integrate hardware and software with a ‘big red safety button’ was underlined.

Are markets complacent about the geopolitical and technological uncertainties highlighted above and those outlined in the 2026 Davos agenda (e.g., labor power erosion, government debt, climate change)?

Not necessarily. Tail risks tend not to weigh much on value because they are either low-probability or slow-burning rather than imminent and binary. Besides, the global economy, including trade, has been surprisingly resilient in recent quarters, and AI is expected to provide structural support to productivity.

Finally, as painful as the transition to new rules could be, I wonder: why could the new global order not emerge as more sustainable than the previous one?

In all scenarios, the corporate function of a Chief Geopolitical Officer, tasked with integrating geopolitics (security, market access, supply chains, reputation) into decisions, including M&A, should rise.